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Abstract-This article presents a model of the number of hours of mental health care, the concurrent 
improvement in the patient’s condition. the probability the patient will receive medications, and the 
reasons for treatment termination. The variables related to these aspects of mental health care are analyzed 
separately for patients of psychiatrists, psychologists. and social workers. Estimates of the average length 
of treatment. the average price and income elasticities, and the average cost of treatment are obtained 
from the model. The major conclusions from this study are that psychiatrists do not have a benefit-cost 
advantage in the treatment of relatively mild conditions, and that consumer responsiveness to variations 
in price appear to be largely confined to the decision to seek treatment. These and other findings provide 
a busis for making tentative recommendations about personnel substitution and reimbursement policies 
in mental health. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study develops a multi-equational model of an episode of mental health care using 
disaggregated data that describe individual patients and those who care for them. The model 
permits the study of the durations of treatment found in actual episodes of clinical care and takes 
into account the concurrent improvement in the patient’s condition, the use of medications, and 
the reasons for termination of care. Three major groups of mental health specialists are considered: 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. These professionals have overlapping expertise, 
especially in the treatment of patients with less severe mental and emotional conditions fl I], and 
they spend the bulk of their time working with these cases [13]. Accordingly, the model is applied 
to patients with these milder conditions. 
The estimated coefficients in the model are used first to make various interprovider comparisons. 
Then, we calculate the effects of provider fees and patient income on the number of treatment hours 
provided by each specialist group. This second analysis provides some indication of the extent to 
which specialists modify their clinical practices in response to financial variables as well as 
perceptions of clinical need. Last, the model is used to simulate the care that patients who are 
receiving care from one provider group might expect to receive if services had been provided by 
a different group. This simulation allows for productivity comparisons across the three types of 
providers. 
Taken together, these analyses enable us to address questions pertaining to the possibilities of 
provider substitution in mental health. The model also allows us to obtain overall estimates of the 
average cost of treatment, the average improvement per unit of input, and the elasticities of 
the hours of treatment with respect to fees, insurance, and patient income. Our results lead us to 
the conclusion that it may be possible to reallocate many patients who are now under the care of 
psychiatrists to psychologists and social workers, obtaining improvements in cost performance 
without loss in the quality of care. This article ends with a discussion of the broader implications 
of our findings for planning the personnel and reimbursement attributes of the mental health care 
provision system. 
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RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The influence of single variables on duration of treatment has been the subject of several studies. 
Pope et al. [22]. Balch et al. [2]. and Carpenter and Range [4] considered the effect of patient fees, 
while May [19] studied the role of the patient’s sex. Sue et al. [ZS] and Silverman and Beech [24] 
included treatment termination and other variables in their analysis of duration of treatment. The 
first efforts by economists to use detailed patient-level data to study duration of treatment include 
those of McGuire [ZO], Keeler er al. [9]. and Manning et al. [l7]. McGuire used data provided by 
a national sample of psychiatrists describing up to their last ten patients treated, and concluded 
that the demand for psychiatric services was about twice as elastic as the demand for general 
medical services. By analyzing data from the Rand Health Insurance Study, Keeler et al. [9] came 
to a similar conclusion, as did Taube et al. [26] using data from the 1980 National Medical Care 
Utilization and Expenditure Survey. In another recent Rand study, Manning et al. [l7] considered 
the decision to seek treatment in relationship to its cost. They found that the out-of-pocket price 
of medical care affects consumer decisions to seek care and decisions about the amount of care 
to purchase. 
These studies have their limitations. The most serious are attributable to shortcomings in 
available data resources and to econometric problems caused by missing explanatory variables or 
truncated dependent variables [27]. For example, despite the large number of enrollees in the Rand 
Health Insurance Study, very few received mental health services. For this reason, Keeler and Wells 
and their colleagues were unable to distinguish between various diagnostic and provider groups; 
nor were they able to take into account a variety of other treatment characteristics. This present 
study uses a data set that describes, in rich detail, the characteristics of mental health care. Our 
data source enables us to construct an elaborate econometric model that overcomes some of the 
limitations of previous work and allows us to consider previously unanswered research questions. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data describing the independent practices of mental health specialists and the treatment they 
provide to individual adult patients come from the Mental Health Service Providers Survey that 
has been described extensively elsewhere [Is]. Briefly, during I982 and 1983, nationally represen- 
tative samples of psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers received questions about 
themselves and about entire episodes of face-to-face care they provided to their last five patients 
who rerminured treatment.? Of 4536 potential respondents, 66% returned valid questionnaires. 
One-third of the respondents did not report on five patients; consequently, data are available on 
approx. 6500 care episodes. Information obtained from a telephone survey of a sample of all 
respondents strongly indicated that patients were reported according to the instructions given. 
Concerning respondents who underreported, perceptions of burden generally prevented reporting 
more patients. A variety of reasonable, comparative procedures found no statistically significant 
differences attributable to patient reporting. 
Several studies were carried out to help establish the accuracy, reliability, and representativeness 
of the survey data [I 1, 12, 14, 151. These studies all indicated that the survey data describe, with 
reasonable accuracy and consistency, the clinical activities and the characteristics of care provided 
tThe larger, overall project sample was divided so that one half received questions about terminated patients and the other 
half received questions about continuing patients. Data on continuing patients are necessarily censored; these data are 
not used in the study described here because we wished to model the entire treatment experience. We did a series of 
regressions to compare the continuing with the terminated patient data to determine whether patient characteristics 
differed by sample type. We found continuing patients. on average, to have been in treatment much less time and to 
have slightly more severe conditions (because continuing patients have not progressed so far through treatment). 
Variables critical to our present study (e.g. the patient’s initial severity. income, age. insurance coverage, etc.) were not 
statistically different by sample type. Both samples were well represented by patients treated briefly or for very long 
periods. Continuing patients are a marginally more chronic group, but this difference is not close to being statistically 
significant. For another study, we have worked with the continuing patient data to infer expected length of treatment. 
We found that continuing patients are associated with out-referrals and treatment drop-outs, making for a shorter mean 
expected length of treatment. Nevertheless. our preliminary analysis of the continuing patient data that pertains to mild 
conditions tends to be consistent with the results of the present study. 
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by mental health specialists who belong to large professional associations. These data are likely 
not representative of professionals belonging to small subspeciality societies for psychoanalysis. 
behavioral medicine. forensic work, etc. 
This data set has the advantage of being large enough to support pruning to remove 
inappropriate data points that might lead to erroneous estimates and stilt leave subsampies targe 
enough for reasonable econometric estimation. Accordingly, the data set was restricted in several 
ways. The total number of patient observations was reduced by 30% when patients with severe 
disorders [i.e. major depression, mania, schizophrenia and ~hi~ophrenifo~ disorder) were 
excluded. Of the remaining cases, 30% were incomplete, missing data of relevance to the current 
study. In order to avoid giving unduly heavy weight to the behavior of providers who had two 
or more patients with the same diagnosis, one patient was selected at random whenever the 
respondent reported multiple patients with the same diagnosis. This procedure further reduced the 
size of the data set, but it did not introduce a new bias because random patient selection was not 
applied significantly more to one provider group than to another. 
We compared the characteristics of patients who entered our sample with those that were 
discarded for any reason, and found no statistically significant differences between the two groups. 
We are aware of no persuasive reason to expect that in deleting portions of the originat data set 
in order to improve the representativeness of the sample, new errors might have been introduced. 
Regarding some of the survey’s specific questions, the duration of treatment refers to the total 
number of t~atment hours the patient received from the provider; it summarizes an uninterrupted 
series of visits that the provider considers to comprise an entire treatment episode. Our survey 
methods prevented us from using definitions f8] that include treatment received from all providers 
or that define episodes delimited by some arbitrary break [e.g. minimum three months complete 
remission before a new treatment episode begins). Nevertheless, our measure has the advantage 
of being the one used for reimbursement purposes and in actual clinical practice. Because 
respondents were asked to report patients for whom they done were primarily responsible, it is 
unlikely that other providers were involved in any major way. 
Only two diagnostic clusters were considered. “Relationship problems*’ is a category that applies 
to patients having problems with marriage partners, family, peers, or similarly placed individuals. 
These conditions are not mental disorders, but are often the focus of professional attention and 
treatment. The second cluster contains al1 patients with anxiety, neurotic (including mild depressive 
neuroses), and personality disorders. By limiting our analysis to patients with relatively mild 
disorders, the possibility of systematic differences between patients is minimized. For example, it 
is unlikely that patients with relationship problems seen by psych~at~sts will differ significantly on 
clinical characteristics from similar patients seen by psychologists and social workers. Moreover, 
a series of statistical comparisons (e.g. age, sex, severity, reason for discontinuing treatment) across 
providers and the two diagnostic clusters did not identify significant differences. 
The initial and final severity of all these conditions were measured using a simplified version of 
the Ctobal Assessment Scale [6] that ranges from 1 (unable to function} to 100 (superior 
functioning). This scale has become one of the major components in the latest ~~ff~~~~~~c anb 
Sraristical Manual of Menral Disorders [I], making it, perhaps, the most widely used in mental 
health and ideal for a study concerned with provider substitution. 
Diagnostic category and condition severity both summarize what are certainly multidimensional 
patient characteristics. The test of our simplifications ultimately rests on the quality of the statistical 
analyses they support. In a study using these diagnostic and severity measures, Knesper et uf. [I41 
found that there were no significant differences among provider groups in their ability to estimate 
a severity level or to select a consistent condition classification of a standardized patient. 
“Drugs” refers to known psychoactive agents in the case of psychiatrists and to any recognized 
drug in the case of the other provider groups. Definitions that differ by provider group were 
necessary because psychiatrists treat most of their patients with some form of drug (primarily 
psychoactive agents), whereas nonphysic~an providers use fewer drugs and report over-the-counter 
medicines. No single definition would be statisticalty useful for both groups. Termination of 
treatment was defined as “normal” if the provider judged the treatment to be completed. In this 
case, the dummy termination variable was given a value of 1. Referrals, no shows, and other forms 
of te~inat~on were all given the variable value of 0. 
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Variable name 







Estimate of the length of an episode of care measured as the total number of hours of treatment with the 
same prowder for a mental condition 
Change in the severity of the mental condition until termination of treatment. The severity scale was obtained 
from Endxott cr ol. [6] 
Dummy variable indicating the use of drugs in treatment. (See tent for definition) 
Dummy variable indicating the reason for termination of treatment. I = the patient terminated treatment 
after obtaininn some or maximum treatment benefits. 0 = all other reasons 
Exogenous variables 
5. TOT # PAT 
6a. PRIOFF 
6b. PUBLIC 
Total number of patients with either physical or mental conditions seen by the provider over the past 60 
days 
Dummy variable indicating that a private office is the principal work setting of the respondent provider 
Dummy variable indicating that either a CMHC or a public hospital is the principal work setting of the . 
respondent provider 
7. FEE%INC Percentage of the providers’ income from their practice emanating from fees 
8. PATAGE* Age of the patient (PATAGE > 18 for all cases) 
9. PATSEX’ Sex of the patient (I = female) 
IO. PATINCOM. Estimate of the patient’s income as reported by the respondent provider 
I I. PATlNP%* Percentage of the treatment performed in an inpatient setting 
12. ISEV’ Patient’s initial severity rating as perceived by the provider (100 = superior functioning. I = unable to 
function) 
13. AVMINVIS* Average number of minutes per visit to the provider 
l4a. NFEE* Net fee per 60 mitt of treatment. The portion of the fee actually paid by the patient NFEE = FEEHRS 
(I.O-INSUR%;lOO) 
l4b. FEE%PATY Ncr fee per 5100 of patient income. FEE%PATY = NFEE*l00/PATINCOM 
IS. INSUR%’ The patient’s average insurance coverage (in percent) 
16. TOT%NEU Percentage of all mental patients seen by the provider over the past 60 days with the same disorder as the 
observational unit 
17. PROEXPER Provider’s cnpericncc. number of years since graduation from medical school or professional program 
18. PRO%PSYCH Average level of psychoanalytic influence in the treatment of mental disorders; 0 to 100% 
19. PROSEX Provider’s sex (I = male) 
All the variable names with an asterisk suffix come from the last five-patrent seetion of the survey. The remaining variables come from the 
sections of the survey eliciting general information about the provider’s practice. 
In responding to survey questions about a patient’s insurance coverage, providers recorded the 
average rate of insurance (from both public institutional and private insurance sources) that was 
available to defray or subsidize the cost of care. Knesper and Pagnucco [I21 studied a subsample 
of providers to ascertain the accuracy of this level of detail. Respondents in this subsample were 
asked to compare their records with the data they reported in the questionnaire; it was found 
that the two corresponded quite closely. Studies preliminary to the actual survey had indicated 
that more detailed insurance data would not be sufficiently accurate for analytical purposes; 
accordingly, additional insurance data were not col1ected.t 
The remaining variables are listed and defined in Table I. Table 2 reports their sample statistics. 
Model speci/cation 
Our previous work [IO] took the accepted position that patients do not consume visits to their 
care providers per se; instead, they seek to purchase improvements in health status. Accordingly, 
hours of treatment and improvement in health status are modelled simultaneously in this study. 
The use of drugs and the reason for termination also are treated as endogenous because the 
perceived change in health status affects these treatment variables (and vice oersa). However, the 
model does not permit duration of treatment to affect the reason for treatment termination, since, 
otherwise, the model could not be estimated [l6]. Table 3 contains the specification of the model; 
selected features of each equation are discussed below. 
The first equation associates hours of treatment with patient and provider characteristics, change 
in health status, and the reason for treatment termination. In principle, both patient and provider 
play a role in determining hours of treatment, while the level of fees probably influences the 
preference of both parties. We assume here, however, that the effect of out-of-pocket expenses on 
patients is more important. For this reason, we include net fee (and, implicitly, insurance coverage) 
tPatients in our data set could have self-selected into certain insurance plans, and that could introduce bias into our analysis. 
Several regressions were run between insurance coverage and initial patient severity; no statistically significant 
relationships were found, suggesting self-selection is not an important consideration. WC do not have data to determine 
if insurance affected the patient’s choice of provider; therefore. our results are conditional on the type of provider. This 
caveat applies also to our simulation procedures described later in the text. 
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Psychiatrists Psychologists soctal worters 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Anxiety. neurotic and prsoaality disorders [NEIJRO] 
62.85 191.35 39.55 100.84 28.45 45.17 
0.64 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.68 0.47 
19.12 19.20 20.01 16.45 la.89 16.60 
0.22 0.42 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36 
92.34 96.96 51.56 46.38 54.12 49.41 
0.09 0.28 0.04 0.2 1 0.03 0.16 
0.67 0.47 0.83 0.38 0.57 0.50 
0.13 0.33 0.06 0.23 0.22 0.42 
67.83 41.19 80.42 35.67 55.64 46.20 
36.68 12.32 34.63 9.27 35.82 10.24 
0.6t 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.74 33 355 77 760 28,421 24 908 23,829 240.& 
9.51 27.17 4.90 20.38 5.62 21166 
50.40 16.96 SO.37 is.09 50.21 IS.03 
43.83 53.13 31.32 26.08 23.87 19.21 
0.87 2.49 0.37 0.67 0.24 0.25 
XI.05 38.25 50.07 37.38 39.92 41.17 
55.08 27.37 72.53 22.91 73.66 25.42 
15.35 9.69 IS.09 7.87 is.97 5 20 2 35 42 64 29 34 56.31 2;1z 
0.86 0.35 0.75 0.43 0.38 a:49 
47.16 13.67 52.88 8.63 52.34 8.40 
174 363 152 







































































36.01 21.53 43.78 
0.48 0.72 0.45 
15.37 13.75 t3.3a 
0.15 0.05 0.22 
52.11 51.30 43.96 
0.17 0.02 0.15 
0.35 0.49 0.50 
0.19 0.23 0.42 
32.76 50.31 47.10 
II.18 35.21 to.74 
0.50 0.65 0.48 
65,157 26,932 44,733 
t 7.27 3.72 17.14 
15.72 59.63 16.30 
25.50 21.51 19.81 
0.54 0.33 0.73 
36.22 42.00 41.95 
20.83 72.91 25.76 
7.39 16.76 a.79 
27.49 St.38 25.67 
0.44 0.33 0.47 
9.63 54.02 a.24 
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but not gross fee in the first equation. Another assumption is that the experience of improvement 
will result in longer treatment encounters, whereas lack of improvement will lead to out-referrals. 
Our overall approach to change in health status is discussed elsewhere [lo]. 
The second equation models improvement (i.e. change in severity) in the patient’s condition. This 
equation includes some provider characteristics, such as the number of years in practice and the 
extent of experience with patients of the same diagnosis group, on the grounds that providers with 
relatively more of these qualities are likely to be more effective. An interaction term between drugs 
Table 3. Model specification 
Equation 
number Equation 
(1) IncLOT) - a, + a,lMPROV + a,TERM + a,PATINCOM + a,PATINP% + a,NFEE + a,TOT + PAT + a,PRIOFF 
+ rqPUBLlC + a,,FEE%lNC + q,PROSEX + +PRO%PSYCH + (I 
(2) IMPROV = & +&LOT f &LOT* + @‘DRUG + &DRLJG’ISEV + &PATAGE + 8,PA~NP% + &TDT%NEU 
+ &PROEXPER + j?,,ISEV + t1 
(3) In(D) = y, f y,PATAGE + y,PATAGE’+ y,TOT # PAT+ y,PUBLlC + y,PRO%PSYCH + y,(E(IMPROVIDRUG = I) 
- E(iMPROVIDRUG - 0)) 
(4) In(T) - b, +&DRUG + b,PATSEX + &FEE%PATY + d,AVMINVIS + &PRIOFF + &PRlOFF.ISEV 
D - P(DRUG - I)/P(DRUG = 0) and 7 - P(TERM - ilDRUG)/~~ERM - OIDRUG). 
and initial severity is included because it is likely that drugs are less effective for relatively healthy 
patients. 
The third equation deats with the probability of drug use. The total number of patients under 
the care of one provider is included because providers with large caseloads are more likely to 
dispense drugs, making drugs a substitute for more time-intensive counseling_ Older patients and 
those treated in public settings are likely to receive more drugs because older patients are more 
likely to have recurrent conditions and public settings, in general, rely more on drugs than on 
counseling. Therefore, variables reflecting these ciinical relationships are also incfuded. Finallyy, we 
introduce the expected productivity of drug treatment by including terms that equal the expected 
level of improvement with drugs minus the expected level of improvement without drugs. This value 
is obtained from the expected value of the improvement equation, and it is through this variable 
that the model accounts for the simultaneity between drugs and the variables in the first two 
equations. We hypothesize that drug treatments should increase with an expected positive 
pr~u~tivity of drugs. This general method is fully explained in Schmidt [23]. 
The final equation concerns the reason for termination. Such events as unilateral terminations 
or referrals most certainly depend on a number of diagnostic and personal variables that are not 
available to us. We are able to include the patient’s income, insurance coverage, and other variables, 
but clearly this is not a completely satisfactory description of the termination decision. This 
equation is not stochastically linked to the other equations in the model because we sought to avoid 
an overly complex model specification. 
Econometric corzsid~rafions 
The model contains the following standard assumptions: 
qc: cj] = E[C:c;] = f#cf] = 0 v i #j, 
EfX,c,] = 0 v i,j, 
(where X represents any exogenous variable) 
(2) 
(3) 
E[DRUG,c,] = 0 V i,j, (4) 
EfTERMj<J = 0 V &j. -31 
These are conventional assumptions; discussions of their acceptability are found in, for example, 
Schmidt 1231 and Maddala [16]. The last two assumptions may be unrealistic; however, dropping 
them would require a much mure extensive and complex model. 
The model is nonlinear and was estimated by extremizing the concentrated likelihood function, 
using a nonlinear optimization program 1211. The standard errors were obtained from the estimated 
information matrix, except for the last equation which was estimated independently.~ 
Since respondents sometimes reported more than one patient with the same diagnosis, we selected 
one patient at random. This procedure guarantees independent observations. The specification was 
determined by testing the model using the discarded observations. To avoid pretest bias, the final 
model was estimated once. 
Following model estimation, inter-provider comparisons were made using a Monte-Carlo 
method suggested by Mariano and Brown [IS]. We adapted their method in order to generate 
overall estimates that are representative of the provider’s caseload. Briefly, we divided the data into 
provider and patient variables; we then sampled with replacement from these sets, and substituted 
the values into our model together with the generated random deviates to obtain estimates of the 
treatment characteristics. Many of the variables in the model are dummy variables, and for the 
tAl1 standard errors used in this articie come from the directly estimated Hessian matrix in comptiancc with tk 
recommendations of Cramer [5]. Several starting points were used IQ dctcrminc if the same results would bc obtained. 
in all cases the results were very similar. A procedure described by Goldfcld and Quandt [7] was then implemented to 
check for muhipk solutions. That is, the functional specification of the duration of treatment and production Function 
equations imply that in the (LOT.lMPROV) space there wilt only be one intersection of the curves. 
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Monte-Carlo method to work properly, it was necessary to generate binary values in some way; 
the use of average values would be improper. The method of sampling with replacement is intended 
to deal with this problem in a way that wit1 generate estimates of the overall treatment 
characteristics. The estimates of the hours of treatment are in logarithmic form; however, we did 
not attempt to make any adjustment to take this transformation into account. Finally, to obtain 
estimates of the cost of treatment, the duration estimates were multiplied by the gross fee. 
The current study has the following possible major limitations. The reader is asked to keep them 
in mind when considering the subsequent portions of this article. 
We have no assurance that gradations in the GAS reflect equal intervals in some fundamental 
diagnostic sense. Thus, improvement on one part of the scale may not be directly comparable to 
improvement on another. Because the recall period varies for respondents, a related concern may 
be that the validity and reliability of the GAS measure may vary with time in treatment. 
Although a previous study ft4] supports the assumption of uniform patient evaluations across 
provider groups, our procedures do not guarantee them. This is particularly troublesome when 
considering providers’ differential effectiveness. It is possible that some providers perceive 
themselves to be more effective than others perceive themselves to be. 
Our model uses mean fee and mean coinsurance data, and we, therefore, assume that price and 
coinsurance are constant. We think this is a strong but not unreasonable assumption. Like the 
studies previously referenced, our patients have been treated by a single provider, but unlike the 
previous studies, both in- and out-patient treatment was possible. Further, outpatient care could 
have taken place in any one of a variety of settings and sometimes for very long periods. We are 
unaware of studies that have analyzed changes in price and coinsurance over the entire range of 
actual treatment experiences. Clearly, as treatment progresses net price could either rise or fall. It 
is possible that, on average, one direction offsets the other over the entire course of treatment; in 
fact, some of our preliminary but unpublished work tends to support this possibility. As a first 
approximation, we believe that it is reasonable to neglect this problem. 
RESULTS 
As described in Table 4, estimates of the model are generally good for the first two equations; 
for the drug and te~ination equations, however, the results are disappointing. The value of an 
estimated R2, calculated from the residuals, is between 0.05 and 0.41 for the duration of treatment 
equation, and between 0.21 and 0.57 for the improvement equation. When compared to the sample 
values found in Table 2, the model underpredicts the hours of treatment for psychiatrists and 
psychologists. However, once some very large outliers were eliminated, the resulting sample 
averages were very close to the model estimates. 
Determinants of hours of treatment and patient ~pro~ement 
Coefficients in the hours of treatment equation are mostly consistent with expectations. The 
longest durations of treatment are associated with patients who terminate “normally”; however, 
this association is significant only for psychiatrists and social workers. As expected, inpatient 
treatment is an important component of psychiatrists’ services; indeed, this is the only provider 
group where percentage of time devoted to inpatient settings is significant. For all provider groups, 
hours of treatment is unaffected by provider caseload. No evidence was found to suggest hours 
of treatment varies much by setting; the work-setting coefficients do not have consistent signs and 
are usually not significant. Female providers tend to be associated with longer treatment periods, 
as are providers whose treatment methods are strongly influenced by psychoanalytic theory. 
Finally, with one exception, patients who achieve more improvement are found to have remained 
longer in treatment. 
For the improvement equation, the patient’s initial severity is the main predictor of improvement. 
The coefficient is highly significant across all providers and diagnosis groups. The relation between 
health status and duration of treatment resembles a logistic function over the relevant range. 
Longer treatments are associated with more improvement, although the coefficient is not significant 














Table 4. Estimation results 
Anxiety, personality and neurosis Rclationshrp problems 
Psychiatrists Psychologists Social workers Psychutrlsts Psychologists Social workers 
Coef. T’ Coef. T’ Coef. T’ Coef. T’ Coef. T’ Coef. T’ 
Length of treatment equation 
0.74841 I .47 I.12196 3.22 0.77958 2.05 1.65yoO 2.99 2.41737 7.14 1.02172 3.35 
0.05852 3.94 0.04685 5.05 0.05178 5.10 0.02329 2.69 -0.02221 3.59 0.03568 3.73 
0.72002 3.44 0.08326 0.61 0.72344 3.45 0.64865 2.35 - 0.0667 I 0.45 0.65122 3.17 
-0.wOl7 0.13 0.00474 1.96 0.00562 1.45 -0.00010 0.09 0.00020 0.08 -0.00136 0.70 
-0.01033 2.34 0.00326 I.17 -0.00495 1.12 -0.00575 0.75 -0.00403 0.82 -0.00287 0.54 
-0.00046 0.24 -0.00300 1.28 -0.00867 1.67 -0.00257 0.60 -0.00741 2.87 -0.01253 2.58 
-0.00142 1.30 -0.00005 0.04 0.00149 0.84 0.00014 0.09 -0.00079 0.66 -0.00396 2.09 
-0.01753 0.06 -0.13171 0.55 -0.03852 0.13 -0.17750 0.46 0.45478 I .74 0.57920 2.18 
0.26959 0.72 0.21748 0.74 0. I3998 0.50 -0.91634 I.88 0.24471 0.67 -0.23324 1.00 
0.00229 0.73 0.00224 0.93 0.00099 0.32 0.00107 0.29 -0.ooo65 0.25 -0.00149 0.53 
-0.40677 1.47 -0.25844 1.96 -0.13985 0.76 -0.37034 1.18 -0.20913 1.47 0.05485 0.30 
0.01343 3.55 0.01316 6.58 0.00331 0.87 0.00330 0.72 0.00675 2.83 0.01 I37 3.48 
Production function eauation 
CONSTANT 30.00874 4.37 48.51223 Il.28 39.90975 5.93 55.03670 6.73 37.41476 10.28 32.80589 7.47 
LOT 0.02593 I .90 0.00500 0.31 0.14006 1.90 0.55736 3.60 0.01 I I9 0.29 0.20192 3.45 
LOT**2 -0.00001 1.70 -O.OOOOO 0.32 -0.00051 1.93 -0.00293 3.22 - 0.00020 2.27 -0.00045 2.82 









:H R2 LOTC 
AH R2 IMPROVd 
NSDTC 
- 5.68976 0.74 -0.60935 0.08 - 12.37822 1.38 
-0.10491 I .65 -0.03526 1.20 0.30887 I .74 
0.12373 1.38 - 0.02028 0.27 -0.07165 0.71 
0.05334 I.21 -0.07967 2.51 -0.OlIO93 0.02 
0.19002 I.58 -0.10434 I.13 0.38102 2.87 
0.04949 I .05 -0.02442 0.68 0.10209 2.07 
I .95 I.13 I .2s 
248.91 174.64 168.79 
-0.49 0.06 -0.36 
0.31 0.41 0.37 
0.26 0.21 0.38 
2 2 4 
Drug use equation 
6.38643 0.68 23.56770 
-0.06423 0.96 - 0.48998 
-0.10091 0.99 0.01641 
-0.03308 0.65 -0.02813 
-0.00776 0.06 - 0.10607 
-0.08022 1.04 -0.04949 






2.03 28.30507 2.70 
I.85 -0.55939 2.69 
0.33 0.09747 I .33 
1 .os -0.01267 0.41 
I .42 0.03141 0.35 







CONSTANT -2.98140 I.19 0.25462 0.12 -2.57930 I.00 -2.67730 0.70 -12.68400 I.82 -67.98900 2.18 
PATAGE 0.23101 2.13 0.00182 0.02 0.01545 0. I2 -0.04079 0.27 0.32446 I .05 2.99310 I .98 
PATAGE** -0.00233 1.82 -0.00007 0.0s 0.00002 0.01 0.00061 0.38 -0.00314 0.85 -0.03720 1.95 
TOT # PAT 0.00263 I .3 I 0.00538 I .76 0.00429 1.03 0.00336 0.97 0.00609 0.85 0.02051 2.19 
PUHLIC 0.76543 1.30 0.78053 I .29 0.93018 1.90 I.11650 I.10 -23.98700 0.01 1.56860 I .45 
PRO%PSYCH -0.0200X 2.59 -0.00856 1.30 -0.002SI 0.27 -0.01459 I.06 0.01 I78 0.78 0.02258 0.93 
ElPROD DRUG)’ 0.25401 2.28 1.04790 3.22 -0.03864 0.76 0.61618 1.98 0. I5789 2.74 1.17530 2.24 
Reason for termination of treatment quation 
CONSTANT 1.57670 2.19 0.58646 0.75 0.20970 0.17 -0.13320 0.09 0.71088 0.91 0.99959 0.78 
DRUG’ -0.59618 1.52 -0.05965 0.17 -0.05784 0.1 I 0. I5763 0.20 0.18972 0.21 1.57850 I.15 
PATSEX 0.17368 0.52 -0.100+31 0.44 0.57647 I.44 0.00046 0.01 0.22705 0.88 0.03 I98 0.08 
FEE%PATY -0.10213 I.41 -0.17084 0.92 -0.93505 1.25 0.67523 0.76 -0.54480 1.67 -0.77163 2.03 
AVMINVIS -0.01095 0.79 0.00398 0.30 0.01248 0.54 0.01774 0.58 -0.00552 0.46 0.00807 0.35 
PRIOFF -0.71406 1.02 -0.99886 1.97 0.07166 0.08 2.69043 1.83 -0.19650 0.31 -0.07873 0.08 
PRIOFFWEV 0.00300 0.25 0.01598 1.92 -0.01030 0.70 -0.0401 I 1.96 0.00863 0.95 -0.00835 0.56 
N 174 363 I52 89 279 I52 
‘Absolute value of “r-stat”. 
bThc bs have been adjusted to yield unbiased estimates following the recommendation of Bard 131. 
‘An aJ hoe R* for the LOT equation derived from MLE residuals. 
“Same as above. but with IMPROV. 
‘Number of significant digits in I-stat. (Applies to the first three equations only.) 
‘The DRUG variable refers only to psychoactive agents in the case of psychiatrists, and it refers to any drugs in the case of psychologists 
and social workers. 
‘PROD DRUG - productivity of drug in treatment. 
in the case of psychologists. Psychologists with more experience report less improvement in health 
status for their patients than do those with less experience. We have no convincing explanation 
for this result beyond speculation that more experienced psychologists may take on less tractable 
patients. Finally, alternative treatment settings does not appear to have a significant impact on the 
outcome of treatment. 
Probability of drug usage and termination type 
It is hardly surprising that drugs are more likely to be used in those cases for which their expected 
productivity is high. Drug treatment is greatest for patients in the vicinity of 50yr of age, and, 
of course, it is much less for patients with mild diagnoses. 
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Table 5 Price. income and insurance elasttcitics of the length of 
treatment 
Dlsordcr 
Psychiatrists Psychologists Socral workers 
9 Time’ q Time’ T Time’ 
Fee elasticity of the LOT 
NEURO 
RELAT 
-0.0273 - 1.03 -0.0935 -2.22 -0.2814 -4.80 
-0.0816 - l .oO -0.2372 -2.79 -0.3277 -4.23 
Income elasticity of the LOT 
NEURO 
RELAT 
-0.0022 -0.08 0.1362 3.23 0.2051 3.50 
-0.0505 -0.62 0.0062 0.07 -0.0151 -0.20 
tnsurancef%) clasticily of the LOT 
NEURO 0.0273 1.03 0.0937 2.22 0. I870 3.19 
RELAT O.OSSf I .08 0.2285 2.69 0.2373 3.07 
The clasticitres wcrc computed by taking the partial derivative of 
LOT with respect to (Fee, income, and Insurance%) not holding 
IMPROV and TERM constant. The elasticities must bc inter- 
preted as being “expected” values thereof. The Monte-Carlo 
method was not applied here; it would not have made much 
scnsc. The elasticities allowing dTERM@VAR = 0 (VAR = fee. 
etc.) and alMPROV/2LOT = 0 did not differ significantly from 
the values shown above. 
‘The value “tlmc” stands for the change in LOT (in min) in response 
to an increase in fees, income. and insurance in each of the 
rcspcctive boxes above. For example. an increase of 1% in fees 
for a psychiatrist’s NEIJRO patients will on average nsult in a 
reduction of 1.03 min of treatment. The percentage change in 
insurance is somewhat complicated to interpret. It refers to the 
percentage change of the insurance coverage whtch is already 
measured in pcrcentagc terms. e.g. a change in coverage from 50 
to 60% ts a 2O%A increase in covcragc. 
The tcrmin~~tion equation has no generally consistent or signi~~nt coeficients. Both this and 
the drug equation are presented for the sake of completeness, and because drug use and the reason 
for termination are plausible components of our study on theoretical grounds. It is possible that 
these equations would have been more successful if more fine-grained categories had been available 
to us. As it is, however, because their results are so unimpressive, these two equations will not be 
considered further. 
Hours of treatment elasticities 
Net fees are inversely related to length of treatment in all versions of our model, satisfying the 
expected condition that increases in fees tend to reduce lengths of treatment while increases in 
insurance tend to increase them. Statistically, however, this relationship is very weak; of the six 
coefficients relating net fee to treatment hours, only two meet minimal criteria for statistical 
significance. Nevertheless, by using the values of the coefficients in Table 4 and the average sample 
values found in Table 2, we computed the implied elasticities (Table 5). All of these elasticities are 
extremely small; none exceed 0.33 (in absolute value), and half of them are below 0.10. In short, 
our data reveal no significant relationships between net fees or patient income and hours of 
treatment. 
The net fee coefficient is largest for social workers and psychologists, and the elasticity with 
respect to fees or insurance coverage is largest for social workers (Table 5). Therefore, to the extent 
that fees, insurance coverage, or patient income do affect hours of treatment, the effect is greater 
on the patients of social workers and psychologists than on the patients of psychiatrists. 
Comparative ~ruducrjvity of alternative care providers 
As described earlier, we employed a Monte-Carlo method to obtain estimates of the dependent 
variables for each provider group in order to compare their relative effectiveness. Using this 
procedure, we examined hypothetical cases where members of one provider group treat patients 
that might otherwise have been treated by another provider group. The object of this exercise is 
to determine any cost-benefit advantages that might be realized in transferring patients from one 
provider group to another. This procedure implicitly assumes that patients do not differ 
significantly across provider groups in characteristics not reflected in our data and that the decision 
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41.20 67.91 42.34 69.79 41.90 
16.71 18.82 16.48 18.17 16.15 
0.22 0.4 I 0.23 0.42 0.23 
0.66 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.65 
3542.38 7410.97 3615.65 8236.64 3635.90 
51.07 17.05 50.45 15.04 50.30 








31.68 51.25 31.56 51.88 31.47 52.9 I 
20.15 14.91 20.37 14.72 20.39 14.86 
DRUG 0.11 0.3 I 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 
TERM 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.48 
COST 2010.78 3480.13 2016.27 4441.47 1998.41 3518.69 
ISEV 50.06 16.71 50.50 IS.12 50.26 IS.18 
FSEV’ 70.20 16.78 70.81 16.21 70.65 16.04 
Social workers 
LOT 26.68 38.82 26.53 38.1 I 25. I I 37.19 
IMPROV 18.29 16.84 18.43 16.62 18.32 16.41 
DRUG 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 
TERM 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45 
COST 1040.29 1709.50 1015.30 1623.76 970.62 1581.15 
ISEV 50.55 16.41 50.03 IS.25 50.03 14.69 
FSEV’ 68.84 16.IJ 68.46 17.75 68.35 15.48 
Rclationshio problems (RELAT) 
Psychiatrists 
LOT 18.35 25.15 18.66 26.0 I 18.74 26.18 
IMPROV 19.72 17.85 20.24 17.28 20.25 17.45 
DRUG 0.12 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34 
TERM 0.10 0.46 0.1 I 0.45 0.71 0.45 
COST 1505.10 2195.67 1520.5 I 2204.74 1540.34 2248.45 
ISEV 61.17 17.15 60.30 15.84 39.95 16.35 
FSEV’ 80.49 13.01 80.54 12.92 80.20 13.01 
Psycholo@ 
LOT 18.15 21.76 17.86 27.17 11.21 26.97 
IMPROV 16.13 13.57 16.53 13.35 16.30 13.23 
DRUG 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 
TERM 0.68 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.46 
COST 1155.93 1818.51 I 119.14 1776.61 1076.17 1132.14 
ISEV 61.05 Il.81 59.92 15.96 60.15 15.16 
FSEV’ 17.18 Il.43 76.45 16.60 16.45 16.51 
Social workers 
LOT 22.40 40.02 23.96 43.10 23.42 41.95 
IMPROV 14.80 15.28 15.14 IS.11 15.01 15.38 
DRUG 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.21 
TERM 0.17 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42 
COST 845.14 1688.58 907.70 1802.03 880.26 1771.35 
ISEV 61.72 16.94 59.83 15.70 59.63 16.43 
FSEV’ 75.80 12.12 14.97 12.30 74.64 12.49 
‘FSEV = final severity of the condition. 
of the patient to seek treatment is independent of the provider type.7 The results are found in 
Table 6. 
The main fact to note from Table 6 is that patient characteristics do not differ significantly by 
provider group. Regarding the diagnosis cluster for the anxiety, neurotic, and personality disorders, 
it is evident that, on average, psychiatrists are associated with a longer duration of treatment than 
are the other provider groups. The psychiatrists’ cost of treatment for this cluster is three times 
that imposed by social workers. Focusing on improvement units (measured in terms of change in 
initial severity) per hour of treatment, psychiatrists do not compare well with the alternative 
providers; the ratio of mean health status improvement per hour is 0.41, 0.65, and 0.73 for 
tAn additional problem is the fact that the coefficients for the duration of treatment variables are not significant for the 
production function for psychologists. Nevertheless, we used these values; consequently, the associated estimates are 
rough. We are reassured about proceeding in this fashion because the values for the psychologists’ coefficients fall neatly 
between the values found for psychologists and social workers. 
Model of mental health care 183 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers, respectively. If we calculate the average ratio of 
cost to improvement we obtain 212.99, and ES for psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers, 
respectively. The ratios of cost to treatment duration are 86, 64, and $39, respectively. Compared 
to other providers, psychiatrists have a longer average duration of treatment, and their patient 
improvement rates are relativety poor. 
fn the case of relationship disorders, the relative effectiveness of psychiatrists is greater: for the 
three provider types, respectively, the ratios of improvement to duration are 1.05, 0.93, and 0.64; 
the ratios of cost to improvement: 78.68, and $59; and the ratios of cost to duration: 82, 63, and 
$36. With this diagnosis group the psychiatrists compare favorably in terms of improvement per 
unit of treatment, although when the cost is taken into account, the psychiatrists* comparative cost 
advantage is still not as great as that of the other providers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Of fundamental concern to any economic analysis of mental health services is the cost-effective- 
ness of service providers. fssues of this sort have been difficult to address, however, because of 
the lack of adequate comparative data describing both providers and their patients. To the best 
of our knowledge, the Mental Health Service Providers Survey dataset is the tirst that makes 
possible a comparison of provider effectiveness while taking into account many significant patient 
characteristics. 
The diagnostic categories investigated by this study are relatively mild, so there is no serious 
medical barrier to treatment of these patients by any of the mental health speciafists considered. 
WC do not expect. for example, that patients with marital problems who choose to see a social 
worker differ much from those that choose to see a psychiatrist. Moreover, we were abtc to control 
for many of the possible sources of difference, such as the patient’s initial severity, age, sex, income, 
and insurance coverage, because variables reflecting these factors are included in our model. 
These and other controls employed by this study permit comparisons across provider groups and 
give us considerabfc confidence in the conclusion that in the cases of patients with relatively mild 
mental problems, efficiency gains may be found from reallocating patients from psychiatrists to 
psychologists and social workers. The cost ratios we have ca~cu!ated reveal important difErences 
among these providers. When both cost and improvement are considered, psychiatrists appear to 
be the least efbcient providers and social workers the most. Moreover, these cost advantages do 
not seem to entail any impairment in the quality of treatment. (However, work in progress indicates 
that psychiatrists are much more cost-effective in treating patients with more severe conditions.) 
An economically efficient mental health provision system must take these differences into account. 
Of course, simulations are inherently limited because it is impossible to account fully and 
accurately for every important real-worfd relationship. For this reason, a key implication of this 
study is that there is a need for randomized clinical trials to assess the differential performance 
outcomes of services provided by atternative provider groups on patients with similarly mifd 
conditions. Studies of this nature would serve to further clarify the substitution issues considered 
by the present investigation, In the absence of such trials, our results provide a basis for the 
implications discussed below. 
insurance companies, state insurance regulatory boards, and health personnel planning groups 
should encourage provider substitution as a cost-cutting measure. A logical place to start would 
be insurance incentives, With few exceptions, providers receive reimbursements regardless of the 
treated condition; reimbursement formulas are often similar for such diverse problems as marital 
discord and schizophrenia. On the other hand, substitution in the direction of increased efficiency 
is becoming easier. In most states, freedom-of-choice laws give mental health specialists indepen- 
dent status, making psychologists and {in many states) social workers eligible to receive third-party 
reimbur~m~nts without physician supervision. It is clear from our results that such laws promote 
an efficient allocation of resources, and that they should be encouraged, At the moment, however, 
these laws do not take into account the patient’s condition. Our study suggests that diagnostic 
category should be taken into account so that treatment of the Iess severe mentai and emotional 
conditions can be reimbursed at lower rates than that of severe mental illness. 
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Further implications for mental health insurance are suggested by the elasticities associated with 
duration of treatment. Among all mental disorders, the diagnostic classes described in this study 
are the mildest. They therefore offer the consumer the most discretion in choosing treatment and 
should show the greatest price responsiveness. For this reason, the small effect of net fees or patient 
income on hours of treatment is an important finding. It suggests that consumer responsiveness 
to variations in gross fee or insurance coverage must be confined largely to the decision to seek 
treatment rather than the decision to prolong treatment. The relative insensitivity of duration of 
treatment to income and fees indicates that variations in fees and insurance will affect mostly the 
numbers of patients seeking treatment. Thus, somewhat more generous reimbursements, especially 
for outpatient care, would be likely to encourage consumer entry but not to affect hours of 
treatment. 
Our research also sheds some light on the common assertion that providers affected by increased 
competition will attempt to compensate for the associated loss in income by encouraging their 
patients to undergo further treatment. We searched for such a relationship by using caseload as 
a proxy for the demand facing the provider. Changes in caseload did not alter treatment duration 
perceptibly; only social workers treating patients with relationship problems seemed to shorten 
duration of treatment when faced with an increased demand. 
We also might expect that providers who receive a salary would be less likely to encourage 
lengthy treatment than would others who work mostly on a fee-for-service basis. Our results fail 
to support this assertion as well. None of the coefficients reflecting the importance of fee in the 
provider’s income was statistically significant. In short, we found no evidence to support the 
“supply-induced demand” or “target income” hypotheses. 
The fact that initial severity is the most influential explanatory variable in our model suggests 
that it might make a significant difference to the overall cost of the mental health system, as well 
as to the general level of mental health across a population, if it were possible to get patients into 
the health care system before their mental health status had deteriorated to the extent that it does 
now. A full analysis of this question is beyond the scope of the current article, but it is relatively 
straightforward to use our model to simulate a provision system in which all patients enter 
treatment with lower initial severity. This would provide a partial indication of the benefits of such 
“early intervention”. A simulation of our model with initial severity scores 20% higher (i.e. less 
impaired) than those actually reported in our data set produces costs and time in treatment that 
are 20% below the original values, with final health status improved by S-10 points. 
Finally, this study has implications for the development of prospective payment systems for the 
financing of mental health care. In general, such payment systems are based on statistical models 
that use patient attributes to predict the average treatment resources they will consume. The present 
Medicare prospective payment system uses the patient’s principal and secondary diagnoses to 
predict consumption of hospital resources. In mental health, these simple models do not have much 
predictive power, and for this reason, many mental health units in hospitals are exempt from this 
program and thus continue to be cost-reimbursed. Many policymakers would prefer mental 
health outpatient services to be reimbursed on a prospective basis, but this extension faces similar 
barriers. 
The current study provides a preliminary indication of how one might develop a prospective 
reimbursement scheme for mental health services. Our model demonstrates how to use the 
characteristics of the patient, the provider, and the treatment setting to estimate the hours of 
treatment, cost, and the concurrent improvement in the patient’s condition. With this information 
in hand, payment schedules could be adjusted to incorporate both cost control and improvement 
objectives, The same sort of model makes it possible to obtain global use and cost estimates for 
any given distribution of patient characteristics. These estimates are essential ingredients when 
planning for the efficient operation of health maintenance organizations, community mental health 
centres. and similar major mental health facilities. Given our model’s limitations, it cannot, in its 
present form, serve as a basis for payment of planning decisions. However, we believe the model 
does offer a basic structure capable of sustaining further building and refinement. Of course, the 
model is complicated, reflecting the uncertainties and complexities of present forms of mental 
health care. Whether a model of this kind will have the necessary political appeal to be adopted 
thus remains an open question. 
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